"A Green-Pink Climate Hysteria!" : Institutional Distrust and the Relationship between Right-Wing Populism and Climate Change Scepticism in Switzerland by Croisier, Julien
“A GREEN-PINK CLIMATE HYSTERIA!”: INSTITUTIONAL DISTRUST AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
SCEPTICISM IN SWITZERLAND   1 
 
“A Green-Pink Climate Hysteria!”: Institutional Distrust and the Relationship between 
Right-Wing Populism and Climate Change Scepticism in Switzerland 
 
Master’s Thesis 
Presented in January 2021 
Author: Julien Croisier 
Social Psychology, University of Lausanne 
 
Under the direction of 
Prof. Christian Staerklé 
Laboratory of Social Psychology (UNILAPS), University of Lausanne 
 
Expert: 
Matteo Cavallaro, PhD 
Senior SNSF Researcher, UNILAPS, University of Lausanne 
 
Author Note:  
 This master’s thesis was written in accordance with its director in English and in a 
scientific paper format. 
“A GREEN-PINK CLIMATE HYSTERIA!”: INSTITUTIONAL DISTRUST AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
SCEPTICISM IN SWITZERLAND   2 
Abstract  
 This study investigated the relationship between right-wing populism (RWP) and two 
forms (evidence and response) of climate change scepticism (CCS) in Switzerland. Two 
hierarchical regression models and two subsequent mediation models were computed. Data 
from the 8th wave of the European Social Survey (ESS) was used. Both hierarchical models 
used common predictors of populism: social status indicators (gender, income, age, education), 
self-appraisals (material risk, political inefficacy, social distrust), institutional distrust, as a 
proxy for anti-elitism and party identification as a last step. The first model (N=699) studied 
the effects of these predictors on response scepticism (doubting policies on climate change), 
the second (N=689) on evidence scepticism (doubting climate change’s anthropogenic causes). 
Hypotheses were that for both forms of CCS, negative self-appraisals would increase levels of 
scepticism and that institutional distrust would have the same effect while controlling for other 
variables. Gender (male), education, institutional distrust and RWP identification were linked 
with higher levels of response scepticism. Regarding evidence scepticism, education, political 
inefficacy and RWP identification were associated with higher levels of scepticism. Mediation 
models showed that the relationship between RWP party identification and response scepticism 
was partly explained by institutional distrust. This exploratory research shows that different 
forms of CCS may be linked differently with RWP, but that institutional distrust could be a key 
link between response scepticism and RWP. Future research should further explore this 
relationship by using discourse analysis, longitudinal and qualitative methods.  
 Keywords: Right-Wing Populism, Climate Change Scepticism, Switzerland, 
Institutional Distrust   
“A GREEN-PINK CLIMATE HYSTERIA!”: INSTITUTIONAL DISTRUST AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
SCEPTICISM IN SWITZERLAND   3 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... 2 
1.1. Right-Wing Populism and the SVP ................................................................................ 5 
1.2. RWP and Climate Change Scepticism (CCS) ................................................................ 7 
1.3. The ‘Elites’ and CCS ...................................................................................................... 9 
1.3.1. Climate Change Scepticism(s) ................................................................................. 9 
1.3.2. Social Status and Self-Appraisals .......................................................................... 10 
1.3.3. Institutional Distrust............................................................................................... 10 
1.3.4. Party Identification................................................................................................. 11 
2. Method ................................................................................................................................. 12 
2.1. Sample and Procedure ................................................................................................... 12 
2.2. Measures ....................................................................................................................... 12 
2.2.1. Self-Appraisals ....................................................................................................... 13 
2.2.2. Institutional Distrust............................................................................................... 14 
2.2.3. Climate Change Scepticism ................................................................................... 14 
2.2.4. Party Identification................................................................................................. 15 
2.3. Correlations ................................................................................................................... 15 
2.4. Design ........................................................................................................................... 17 
2.5. Data Analysis ................................................................................................................ 17 
3. Results .................................................................................................................................. 18 
3.1. Mean Differences for Institutional Distrust, CCRS and CCES by SVP Identification 18 
3.2. Hierarchical Regressions .............................................................................................. 19 
3.2.1. Climate Change Response Scepticism (CCRS) ..................................................... 19 
3.2.2. Climate Change Evidence Scepticism (CCES)...................................................... 20 
3.3. Mediation Analyses: SVP Identification and CCR/ES through Institutional Distrust . 21 
4. Discussion ............................................................................................................................ 22 
4.1. Response Scepticism ..................................................................................................... 23 
4.2. Evidence Scepticism ..................................................................................................... 24 
4.3. Implications ................................................................................................................... 25 
4.3.1. Response Scepticism’s Paradox ............................................................................. 26 
4.3.2. Evidence Scepticism, an Educational rather than Political Issue? ......................... 26 
4.4. Limits and Ideas for Future Research ........................................................................... 28 
5. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 29 
References ................................................................................................................................ 31 
 
  
“A GREEN-PINK CLIMATE HYSTERIA!”: INSTITUTIONAL DISTRUST AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
SCEPTICISM IN SWITZERLAND   4 
 I opened my letterbox one fine summer morning of 2019 to find the Édition Spéciale 
of the SVP, (June 2019), the ‘current party affairs’ sent to all Swiss households by the SVP1 
and entitled: “Reason must replace ideology” (own translation). This booklet’s (newspaper 
format) theme was climate change, and moreover the “green-pink climate hysteria” (sic) and 
its potential deleterious effects, according to the right-wing populist (RWP) party, on 
immigration or the economy.  
 The SVP has been at the forefront of Swiss politics for some years, and is currently the 
most strongly represented party in parliament (admin.ch, 2017). It is thus an unusual case of a 
governing populist party that shifted from a more traditional conservative standpoint to RWP 
discourse over the last two decades. Research on populist parties in Europe found that the “SVP 
engages in blame-shifting arguments presenting socialism as the cause of all pollution” 
(Gemenis, Konstantinos, Katsanidou, Alexia, & Vasilopoulou, Sofia, 2012:15) and that, more 
generally, RWP uses climate change as a means of positively presenting the nation by its 
natural beauty that should be protected for the people it belongs to (Forchtner & Kølvraa, 
2015). Thus, this research will focus on Switzerland where RWP is a significant part of the 
political landscape through the SVP (Ennser, 2012). 
 Climate change is one of if not the most pressing issue of the times and its significant 
impact can already be witnessed around the globe and should worsen in the coming decades 
(Jorgenson et al., 2019). Humans are impacting multiple systems on the planet and are in turn 
impacted by these changes (Dietz, 2017). Reports and research indicate a consensus amongst 
climate scientists on these changes and their anthropogenic causes and consequences (Cook et 
al., 2016; IPCC, 2018; Stern, 2011; Swim et al., 2011). Nevertheless, consensus on the 
 
1 Swiss People’s Party, Switzerland’s RWP party, formerly known as the Party of Farmers 
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anthropogenic causes of climate change is not always observed in the public, as a third of 
Americans for instance think that it emerges from natural causes (Leiserowitz et al., 2019).  
 Indeed, growing scientific contributions and research consensus have shifted climate 
change sceptics discourse from criticising the lack of consensus to criticising its certainty 
(Nerlich, 2010).  Research for instance pointed out that “conservative and traditional values” 
were linked with scepticism about climate change (Hornsey et al., 2016; Poortinga et al., 2011). 
This was also observed among individuals who were endorsing free-market views 
(Lewandowsky et al., 2013) and conspiracy theories (Fernbach et al., 2013). More recent 
research indicated that voters of right-wing populist parties were more susceptible to be 
sceptical about the anthropogenic causes of climate change (Jylhä & Hellmer, 2020; 
Lockwood, 2018). Nevertheless, the link between right-wing populism and climate change 
scepticism remains little explored. Switzerland’s SVP’s recent discourse shift on climate 
change thus makes for a compelling study material. 
1.1. Right-Wing Populism and the SVP  
 In recent years, right-wing populism has surged across Europe and the Americas 
(Postill, 2018). Populist parties or politicians have won elections in various settings and their 
influence has thus grown steadily, as well as the body of research on the subject (Rooduijn, 
2019). Populism has been described as a ‘thin’ ideology borrowing its concepts, ideas and 
policies from other ideologies (Stanley, 2008). Scholars from a variety of fields have 
researched the core factors of populism. RWP was found to depend in part on the proclamation 
of an allegedly homogenous group: ‘the people’ (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007) and on the 
opposition of this group to an antagonist one: ‘the elites’ (Kriesi, 2014). The SVP does not 
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make an exception to the rule and regularly criticises so-called political, cultural and scientific 
elites2. 
 Moreover, the materialisation of populist parties across Europe as mostly right-wing 
(Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012) brought anti-immigration policies and attitudes to the forefront of 
the research. In Switzerland, the SVP strongly advocated for strong limitations on immigration, 
and famously won a nationwide vote in 2014 that called for such restrictions. Scholars pointed 
out that these attitudes were linked to self-appraisals such as relative deprivation or material 
risk (Greitemeyer & Sagioglou, 2017, 2019; Jetten et al., 2015; Mols & Jetten, 2016), prejudice 
(Crawford & Brandt, 2019), negative self-identity (Spruyt et al., 2016), political inefficacy and 
social distrust (Staerklé & Green, 2018) or civilisationism (Brubaker, 2017), but could for 
instance be reduced through intergroup contact (Green et al., 2010; Pehrson & Green, 2010; 
Sarrasin et al., 2012). Therefore, RWP research has so far focused on a tripartite relationship – 
or lack thereof – between an ingroup - the people - and two outgroups - the elites and the 
immigrants. Indicators of social status, and self-appraisals such as material risk, social distrust 
and inefficacy were found to be linked with negative attitudes towards these two outgroups 
(Staerklé & Green, 2018).  
 In sum, research pointed out that populism was usually built around a centration on ‘the 
people’ as a homogenous group, criticism of ‘corrupt elites’ and the proclamation of a ‘serious 
crisis’ (Rooduijn, 2014). But more recently, some right-wing populist parties in the Western 
world have produced discourse on climate change, doubting its anthropogenic causes through 
climate change scepticism (Forchtner, 2019a; Forchtner et al., 2018) or using it as a means to 
promote an anti-immigration agenda (Aufrecht, 2012). 
 
2 For more information on the subject, the party’s political program (available in French, German and Italian) 
makes for a compelling read (SVP, 2020) 
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1.2. RWP and Climate Change Scepticism (CCS)  
 Research so far has for the most part been focused on climate change scepticism in the 
“mainstream” political spectrum (Jylhä & Hellmer, 2020). Even though the scientific 
community reached consensus on the anthropogenic causes of climate change, some politicians 
and communities oppose these facts, or don’t believe in them (Hulme, 2017).  
 Climate change scepticism and its conceptualisation are debated in the field and its 
definitions are sometimes criticised and discussed. Scholars have worked towards a typology 
that would cover its different manifestations (Capstick & Pidgeon, 2014; Gemenis et al., 2012; 
Lockwood, 2018; Poortinga et al., 2011; Van Rensburg, 2015). Van Rensburg (2015) offers a 
compelling conceptualisation of the different forms that climate change scepticism (CCS) may 
take around three key concepts: evidence, process and response scepticism. In short, evidence 
scepticism (CCES) entails challenges made to “the scientific evidence of anthropogenic climate 
change” (p.3). Process scepticism is centred on doubts on the funding of climate change 
research and usually revolves around suspicion that politicians and scientists alike promote a 
hidden agenda. Lastly, response scepticism (CCRS) can be summarised as scepticism aimed 
towards policies designed to harness climate change. Research so far has shown some trends 
in results on the underlying conditions allowing climate change scepticism but seldomly uses 
the same conceptualisations of CCS. 
 Scholars so far found that people with lower socio-economic status (Poortinga et al., 
2011) and conservatives were more likely to be sceptic about climate change (Forchtner, 
2019a; Tranter, 2017), and more particularly conservative white males (McCright & Dunlap, 
2011) as climate change and action directed towards harnessing it may clash with traditional 
conservative values (McCright et al., 2016). Moreover, individuals identifying with the far-
right rather than the left or centre-right tend to hold more sceptic views (Whitmarsh & Corner, 
2017) regarding climate change, which was for instance found in Norway to merge with 
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broader nationalist thought patterns (Krange et al., 2019). Regarding climate change scepticism 
and RWP, individuals identifying to the latter in Germany were rather sceptical, their 
scepticism depending on the emphasis attributed to the “homeland” and the link between its 
protection and ecology (Forchtner et al., 2018). Following this research, authors concluded that 
RWP could also seek to protect the local environment in order to protect the integrity of the 
“homeland” (Forchtner, 2019b). Moreover, some scholars have argued that European RWP 
parties “do not reject [climate] science outright, but instead seek to marginalise the climate 
agenda in order to concentrate on border control and immigration” (Jeffries, 2017). I would 
argue that recent social movements such as the climate strikes where significant numbers have 
protested (Taylor et al., 2019) have brought the issue at the centre of the political debate.  
 In sum, RWP appears to harness nationalist thought patterns as well as conservatism in 
order to challenge climate change scientific evidence or political response. Nevertheless, this 
relationship seems to be multidimensional as RWP parties need to navigate between rejecting 
policies from other parts of the political spectrum all the while pushing for the protection of 
the ‘homeland’ and its natural riches through, for instance, anti-immigration policies. This wide 
array of findings strongly points in the direction of a psychosocial approach to climate change 
scepticism. The literature does so far not contain a large amount of research on populism and 
climate change (scepticism), but an exploratory article by Lockwood (2018) examined the 
linkage between climate change discourse and right-wing populism. They pointed out that 
RWP voters and leaders tended to be sceptical about climate change and policies intending to 
harness it. Furthermore, they argued that an ‘ideological approach’ should be used while 
exploring the link with “climate change and policy occupying a symbolic place” in the contrast 
between ‘the people’ and a cosmopolitan elite.  
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1.3. The ‘Elites’ and CCS 
 The study of the relationship between RWP and climate change scepticism should 
consider one of populism’s core factors, anti-elitism, or institutional distrust (Jagers & 
Walgrave, 2007; Kriesi, 2014; Rooduijn, 2014). Recent results concluded that anti-
establishment feelings did not significantly predict climate change denial (Jylhä & Hellmer, 
2020), but I argue that institutional distrust can be used both as a proxy of anti-elitism as 
theorised in the literature on RWP (Bos et al., 2020) and as a means to encompass rejection of 
both political and scientific elites. Following Fairbrother (2017), I argue that institutional 
distrust is a prolongation of negative attitudes towards political elites to negative attitudes 
towards political elites and science in a conspiracist mentality which was found to be linked 
with RWP (Silva et al., 2017). This relationship is interpreted as a rejection of the 
recommendations made by scientist to policymakers and as a rejection of policies themselves.  
 As Mudde and Kaltwasser (2018) suggested, research on populism should build on 
existing findings in order to ensure continuity in a growing and varied field. Moreover, 
recommendations by Rooduijn (2019) pointed out that scholars should become “more and less 
focused”, which means that research on populism – while using concepts and prior work from 
different fields – should remain concise and employ a strict conceptualisation adapted to the 
research in hand. This compelling argument translates in the present paper through a thorough 
definition and delimitation of its key concepts: social status, self-appraisals, institutional 
distrust and climate change scepticism.  
1.3.1. Climate Change Scepticism(s) 
 Following recommendations made by Forchtner et al. (2018) and given the available 
data, I will focus on evidence scepticism (from denying climate change to denying its 
anthropogenic causes) and response scepticism (questioning policy responses) which are 
defined more precisely in a previous paragraph.  
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1.3.2. Social Status and Self-Appraisals 
 Social status is used through measures and categories of age, gender, education level 
and income. These have been widely used in research both as control and predictors of RWP 
attitudes (Goodwin & Heath, 2016; Hobolt, 2016). Self-appraisals are central to the social 
representational approach of this research. These self-evaluations are centred on material risk, 
political inefficacy and social distrust and were found to be core factors explaining RWP 
attitudes in prior research (Staerklé & Green, 2018). I argue that material risk may lead to 
consider that harnessing climate change could be costly and thus not be wanted by individuals 
which feel deprived. One could also suggest that identifying oneself to a more deprived group 
may lead to defend this group’s interests (which may be under-threat low-income industrial 
jobs for instance) and hence reject restrictions on certain industrial activities. Political 
inefficacy may give people the sense that politics do not take them into account and thus lead 
them to rejecting climate change policies which are conceived by policymakers as a means to 
protest them. Finally, social distrust may play a negative role in the collective action against 
climate change. Individuals may reason that others would not act in any case and thus not act 
themselves (e.g. voting behaviours). Following this reasoning, negative self-appraisals should 
lead to a higher level of climate change response and evidence scepticism.  
1.3.3. Institutional Distrust 
 Significant levels of institutional distrust should be linked with climate change 
scepticism in the models presented in this paper. As said before, political institutions are 
usually rejected by RWP and the SVP’s Édition Spéciale does not make an exception to the 
rule. Moreover, the party’s discourse doubts scientific facts on climate change and seems to 
present its own “alternative facts”. Hence, the party may be shifting from rejecting political 
elites to rejecting these as well as scientific and cultural ones by presenting them as one 
homogenous entity, which may lead to climate change scepticism in its supporters. 
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 I argue that institutional distrust as a central component of RWP explains the link 
between populism and CCS by holding a central part in the relationship between social status, 
self-appraisals and climate change scepticism. Thus, higher levels of institutional distrust 
should lead to higher levels of climate change scepticism (CCS) while controlling for social 
status and self-appraisals.  
1.3.4. Party Identification 
 A final measure of party identification will be used in this research. This will allow to 
test whether SVP identification relates to measures of institutional distrust, CCRS and CCES. 
Identifying to the SVP should relate to higher levels of all three concepts.  
There is considerable research on RWP populism and climate change scepticism as 
separate matters of interest, but few research has explored their link (Forchtner, 2019a; Jylhä 
& Hellmer, 2020; Lockwood, 2018). Thus, it appears particularly compelling to explore this 
relationship in Switzerland where the SVP is the most represented party in parliament and 
appears to have adopted a climate change scepticism direction. Additionally, adopting a social 
representations approach allows to consider multiple psychosocial factors and thus offer a 
broad explanation of the phenomenon. Hence, I will test two hierarchical model predicting 
climate change response or evidence scepticism using common and accepted predictors of 
RWP: Social Status, Self-Appraisals and Institutional Distrust as explanatory factors, and will 
add party identification in order to answer this research’s question on the link between CCS 
and RWP. Moreover, additional mediation analyses will be provided in order to test the link 
between RWP and CCS through institutional distrust as theorised in this introduction. 
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2. Method  
2.1. Sample and Procedure 
 Data from the European Social Survey (ESS) round eight (2016) was selected for its 
rotating module on “Attitudes and climate change”. The ESS is a cross-national European 
survey that has been conducted once every two years form 2001 on. Face-to-face interviews 
are conducted with individuals 16 years old and over on various topics, and a new rotating 
module is implemented each round3. The sample selected for this study was restricted to 
participants from Switzerland, which represented a subsample of n=1,525 respondents. Data 
was analysed using SPSS version 25, and the PROCESS macro v.3.4 (Hayes, 2019) 
 The age distribution from this subsample was 47.8 years (SD = 18.8). Regarding gender 
distribution, Female respondents were 48.3%, with most respondents (81.3%) of Swiss 
nationality.  
2.2. Measures 
 Income level was measured by household total net income (all sources) and categorised 
in deciles (n = 1,251). 
 Education level (n = 1,520) was considered using the ES-ISCED classification in seven 
levels ranging from 1 (less than lower secondary) to 7 (higher tertiary education, Masters level 





3 Additional information on the ESS can be found on the European Social Survey Website: 
https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/# 
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Table 1 
 
Frequency Table for Household Income and Respondent Education Level 
                        
Household Income Level [%] 
Deciles 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Missing 
 4.4 8.0 9.4 10.0 9.6 10.1 11.0 7.8 5.6 6.2 18.0 
                        






















(>=MA)       Missing 
 3.3 17.4 35.6 8.0 14.8 7.5 12.9    0.3 
 
2.2.1. Self-Appraisals 
 Perceived political inefficacy was measured on respondents’ subjective ability to 
participate in politics. Three items were selected and reversed: Political system allows people 
to have a say in what the government does; Political system allows people to have influence 
on politics; Confident in own ability to participate in politics. Responses were recorded on a 
five-point scale ranging from 1 (a great deal) to 5 (not at all), with higher scores indicating 
political inefficacy. Preliminary principal component analysis (PCA) showed that the three 
items loaded on a single factor. Reliability analysis of the constructed item produced a 
Cronbach’s α of 0.69. 
 Perceived social distrust was assessed by selecting three items assessing respondents’ 
perceived general trust in other people: Most people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful; 
Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair; Most of the time people helpful or 
mostly looking out for themselves. Answers were reversed and represented on a scale from 0 
(most people can be trusted) to 10 (you can’t be too careful) with higher scores indicating a 
higher level of social distrust. Preliminary PCA resulted in one underlying factor for these three 
items. Cronbach’s α was 0.69.  
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 The last self-appraisal dimension, material risk, was measured by choosing two items 
representing household financial stability: Feeling about household’s income nowadays; How 
likely not enough money for household necessities next 12 months. A preliminary PCA on three 
items resulted in one common factor, but one item (likelihood of unemployment over the next 
12 months) was abandoned as it had too many missing cases. Thus, material risk was built 
using a composite score of two items (r = .47, p<0.001) on four-point scales with higher scores 
indicating more perceived financial difficulties.  
2.2.2. Institutional Distrust 
 The anti-elitism section of this research - one of RWP’s core components – had to be 
measured at the local and global level as climate change has both implications. Thus, trust in 
and satisfaction with local and global institutions (e.g., legal system, government, politicians, 
political parties) was assessed on eight items: Trust in the legal system/in politicians/in the 
European Parliament/in the United Nations/in political parties/in country’s parliament; How 
satisfied with the national government; How satisfied with the way democracy works in 
country. Answers were recorded on an eleven-point scale (reversed) from 0 (extremely) to 10 
(extremely not) on measures of trust and satisfaction. Higher scores indicated less 
satisfaction/trust in the institutions. Preliminary PCA indicated that eight items loaded on a 
single factor. Cronbach’s α was 0.89. 
2.2.3. Climate Change Scepticism  
 Response Scepticism (CCRS) was assessed by three items measuring adhesion to 
climate change policies, such as taxes or bans on fossil fuels or subsidies for green energies: 
Favour ban sale of least energy efficient household appliances to reduce climate change; 
Favour increase taxes on fossil fuels to reduce climate change; Favour subsidise renewable 
energy to reduce climate change. Scales went from 1 (in favour of taxes, bans or subsidies) to 
5 (not in favour). A principal component analysis yielded a single common factor for the three 
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items with an alpha of 0.75. CCRS can be summarised as scepticism aimed towards concrete 
responses to climate change, such as policies, restrictions or practical changes implemented by 
governments or organisations. 
 Evidence Scepticism (CCES) was evaluated by four items measuring respondents’ 
opinion on climate change, namely its anthropogenic causes and consequences: Do you think 
world’s climate is changing; Climate change caused by natural processes, human activity, or 
both, reversed; How much thought about climate change before today, reversed; How worried 
about climate change, reversed. As scale ranges differed, scores were standardised. Higher 
scores indicated a greater tendency towards evidence scepticism towards climate change. 
Preliminary PCA resulted in a single underlying factor for the four items. Cronbach’s α was 
0.61.  It must be noted that most respondents (>94%), when asked whether they thought that 
climate change had natural or anthropogenic causes responded closer to the latter, but plotted 
distributions still showed varying tendencies in the sample. CCES is thus more abstract than 
CCRS and should relate more to education or information levels on climate change. 
2.2.4. Party Identification 
 One item was used for SVP Party Identification and recoded into a new variable. The 
original item asked respondents which Swiss party they felt closest two. After recoding, the 
new SVP identification was 1 (Other party) or 2 (SVP).  
2.3. Correlations 
 Table 2 shows Pearson’s correlations for the study variables. Several statistically 
significant relationships were noted. First, income was negatively associated with political 
inefficacy (r=-.22, p<.01), material risk (r=-.44, p<.01) and institutional distrust (r=-.12, 
p<.01) and education was negatively correlated with all indicators of self-appraisals, 
institutional distrust and CCS. Second, self-appraisals correlated positively among themselves, 
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albeit without passing the threshold of .70 described by Tabachnick & Fidell (2007) and which 
may indicate multicollinearity (correlations ranged from r=.15 to .25, p<.01). Third, 
institutional distrust positively correlated with all indicators except for gender and evidence 
scepticism and notably with social distrust (r=.29, p<.01), material risk (r=.14, p<.01) and 
response scepticism (r=.20, p<.01).  
 Response scepticism additionally negatively correlated to education (r=-.14, p<.01), 
and positively with political inefficacy (r=.14, p<.01), social distrust (r=.13, p<.01), material 
risk (r=.10, p<.01) and evidence scepticism (r=.39, p<.01). Regarding evidence scepticism, 
its strong positive correlation with response scepticism and lack of other significant 
correlations except for education (r=-.21, p<.01) and political inefficacy (r=.17, p<.01) 
indicated that this form of CCS could yield different results. SVP identification negatively 
correlated to education (r=-.22, p<.01), and positively to social distrust (r=.10, p<.01), 
institutional distrust (r=.21, p<.01), evidence scepticism (r=.21, p<.01) and response 
scepticism (r=.29, p<.01). 
 
Group Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Social Status 1. Gender (a) -
2. Age -0.03 -
3. Income (b) 0.07* -.18** -
4. Education .12
** 0.00    -.38** -
Self-Appraisals 5. Political Ineff. -.10
** 0.04    -.22** -.29** -
6. Social Dist. 0.04    -.13** -0.03 -.15** .15** -
7. Material risk -0.02 -.05* -.44** -.19** .25** .24** -
Instit. Distrust 8. Instit. Dis. 0.04    .12** -.12** -.05* .22** .29** .14** -
CCS 9. Evidence Sc, -0.03 .07** -0.04 -.21** .17** 0.02    0.00    0.02    -
10. Response Sc. .06* 0.01    -0.04 -.14** .14** .13** .10** .20** .39** -
SVP Identif. 11. SVP Id. (c) 0.07    0.06-    -0.05 -.22** 0.04    .10** 0.00-    .21** .21** .29** -
a 1 Female, 2 Male
b Income in deciles
c 1 Other Party, 2 SVP Identification
Table 2
Pearsons' Correlations for Study Variables
*p < .05. **p<.01
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2.4. Design 
 The main aim of this study – exploring the link between RWP and CCS – requires 
testing two four stage hierarchical regression models predicting evidence and response 
scepticism respectively before testing a more specific mediation analysis on the relationship 
between SVP identification and CCRS/CCES through institutional distrust. First, variables of 
social status (age, gender, household income and education level) serve as control and first-
step predictors. Political inefficacy, social distrust and material risk, the three subdimensions 
of self-appraisals are then added, before entering institutional distrust, the proxy used for anti-
elitism, and party identification as a last step in the model. Outcomes vary from response 
scepticism in the first model to evidence scepticism in the second. 
 I argue that both relationships are mediated by institutional distrust as a proxy for anti-
elitism. Thus, two mediation analyses will be conducted to test the link between SVP 
identification and CCRS or CCES through institutional distrust.  
2.5. Data Analysis 
 First, t-tests were computed to test the mean differences between institutional distrust, 
CCRS and CCES levels by SVP identification. As computed items for climate change evidence 
scepticism had different scales, standardised scores were used for both models to ensure 
coherence throughout the study. Scores varied from low to high levels of RWP and CCS for 
each model. Potential issues of multicollinearity were checked using VIF (variance inflation 
factor). Second, two hierarchical multiple regression analyses were conducted to analyse the 
explanatory path between social status (step 1), self-appraisals (step 2), institutional distrust 
(step 3), party identification (step 4) and CCS (outcome). Outcome variables were response 
and evidence scepticism. Finally, two additional mediation analyses tested the link between 
SVP identification and CCRS/CCES through institutional distrust. 
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3. Results  
3.1. Mean Differences for Institutional Distrust, CCRS and CCES by SVP Identification 
 Since all variables were standardised, the following table (Table 3) describes mean 
differences for SVP identification versus other party identification for institutional distrust, 
CCES and CCRS. Higher means for distrust and scepticism were found in the sample for SVP 
identification versus other party identification. This suggests that individuals identifying with 
SVP may be more distrustful of institutions and hold more sceptic views. All means were 
statistically different at the .01 level.  
Table 3 
 
Means Table and t-test results for Institutional Distrust, CCES and CCRS for Party Identification (z 
scores) 
        
 Institutional Distrust  CCES CCRS 
SVP 
(N=226) 0.315** 0.320** 0.401** 
Other 
(N=586) -0.151** -0.160** -0.251** 
    
Note: Higher means indicated higher levels of distrust or scepticism, N=808; **p<.01 
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3.2. Hierarchical Regressions 
 
3.2.1. Climate Change Response Scepticism (CCRS)  
 The hierarchical regression predicting climate change response scepticism (CCRS) 
according to social status, self-appraisals, institutional distrust and party identification is 
displayed in Table 4. At step 1, gender (males) and education (lower education level) were both 
significantly linked with CCRS, but age and income were not. Social status measures explained 
3% of the model’s variance [F(4,695)=8.13, p<.001]. Step 2 measured the impact of self-
appraisals while controlling for social status and further explained 2% of the model’s variance 
[F(7,692)=6.04, p<.001]. At this stage, gender and education remained significant, while 
Variables CCRS CCES
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant - - - - - - - -
Gender .14** .14** .14** .12** -.01 0.01 0.01 -.01
Age (a) -.02 -.01 -.01 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.07*
Income -.01 -.01 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04
Education -.17** -.15** -.16** -.10* -.26** -.23** -.23** -.18**
Political Inefficacy 0.08 0.05 0.05 .15** .15** .15**
Social Distrust 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
Material Risk 0.05 0.05 0.06 -.06 -.06 -.05
Institutional Distrust .12** 0.07 -.01 -.05


















R2 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.11
a 1 Female, 2 Male
b 1=Other, 2=SVP
Standardised scores, No multicollinearity (all VIFs comprised between 1 and 10)
*p < .05. **p<.01
Table 4
Hierarchical rergressions predicting climate change response and evidence scepticism 
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added variables were not. The next step included all predictors but party identification and 
accounted for 1% more [F(8,691)=6.49, p<.001] of the total variance. All prior predictors 
remained stable and institutional distrust was found to be positively and significantly correlated 
to CCRS. The last step [F(9,690)=10.24, p<.001] included SVP party identification and 
accounted for 5% of the total variance (11%). Gender and education remained statistically 
significant, while institutional distrust did not. SVP identification was found to be positively 
linked with CCRS. 
3.2.2. Climate Change Evidence Scepticism (CCES) 
 The second hierarchical regression of this study (Table 4) kept the same predictors as 
the first one but used climate change evidence scepticism (from denying climate change to 
denying its anthropogenic causes) as an outcome. Step 1 explained 6% of the variance and was 
significant [F(4,685)=12.24, p<.001]. Education was the only indicator of social status to be 
significantly correlated to climate change evidence scepticism (CCES), with lower education 
levels correlating to higher levels of CCES. While controlling for social status measures, step 
2 added indicators of self-appraisals into the equation. Political inefficacy was the only measure 
positively and significantly linked with CCES. This step accounted for 2% more of the total 
variance [F(7,682)=9.39, p<.001]. The third model, albeit statistically significant 
[F(8,681)=8.21, p<.001] did not account for any additional variance (ΔR²=0.00). Thus, 
institutional distrust was not found to have any impact on CCES and education and political 
efficacy remained significant predictors. The complete model [F(9,680)=10.31, p<.001] added 
SVP identification which was positively and significantly correlated with CCES and accounted 
for 3% more of the total variance (11%) while other predictors remained stable, except for age 
which became significant and positively correlated with CCES. 
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3.3. Mediation Analyses: SVP Identification and CCR/ES through Institutional Distrust 
 In order to test whether RWP is indeed linked with CCS through institutional distrust, 
two additional mediation analyses were conducted. The first analysis used SVP identification 
as a predictor, CCRS as an outcome and institutional distrust as a mediator.  
 
 The relationship between SVP identification and CCRS was mediated by institutional 
distrust. As Figure 1 illustrates, the standardised regression coefficient between SVP and CCRS 
was significant (.24, p < .001), as well as the coefficient between SVP identification and 
institutional distrust (.21, p < .001). Both relationships stated that SVP identification led to 
higher levels of distrust and scepticism while controlling for education level. Institutional 
distrust, in turn, was significantly related to CCRS (.14, p < .001). The standardised indirect 
effect was .03 and was tested using 5,000 bootstrapped samples. The 95% confidence interval 
ranged from .01 to .05 and the effect was thus significant. Moreover, the mediation effect 
accounted for 11% of the relationship between SVP identification and CCRS. 
.21** .14**
.24** (.03*)
a 1 Other Party, 2 SVP Identification
b From Less to More Distrust
c From Less to More Scepticism
N=808
Figure 1
Standardised Regression Coefficients for the Relationship Between SVP Identification and Climate Change Response Scepticism (CCRS) as Mediated 
By Institutional Distrust while Controlling for Education Level.
 In parentheses: The standardised regression coefficient between SVP identification and CCRS, controlling for education level..
Institutional Distrust (b)
SVP Identification (a) CCRS (c)
*p < .05. **p<.01
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 The relationship between SVP identification and CCES was not mediated by 
institutional distrust. As Figure 2 illustrates, the standardised regression coefficient between 
SVP and CCES was statistically significant, as well as the coefficient between SVP 
identification and institutional distrust. Both relationships stated that SVP identification led to 
higher levels of distrust and scepticism while controlling for education level.  
4. Discussion  
 This study aimed to explore the link between right-wing populism (RWP) and climate 
change scepticism (CCS) in Switzerland. This seldomly researched but apparent relationship 
called for exploratory analyses. In sum, hypotheses were that indicators of lower social status, 
negative self-appraisals (i.e. higher levels of inefficacy for instance) and higher levels of 
institutional distrust and SVP party identification should lead to higher levels of scepticism. 
Moreover, an additional hypothesis stated that institutional distrust mediated the relationship 
between RWP identification and both forms of CCS. 
.21** -0.2
.18** (-)
a 1 Other Party, 2 SVP Identification
b From Less to More Distrust
c From Less to More Scepticism
N=792
*p < .05. **p<.01
 In parentheses: The standardised regression coefficient between SVP identification and CCRS, controlling for education level..
Figure 2
Standardised Regression Coefficients for the Relationship Between SVP Identification and Climate Change Evidence Scepticism (CCES) as Mediated 
By Institutional Distrust while Controlling for Education Level.
Institutional Distrust (b)
SVP Identification (a) CCES (c)
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 Mean differences were tested for institutional distrust, CCRS and CCES by party (SVP) 
identification. Individuals identifying to the SVP, Switzerland’s RWP party, showed 
statistically significantly higher levels of distrust and climate change scepticism. This validates 
the overlapping hypothesis of this research that stated that individuals feeling close to the SVP 
could show more distrust in the institutions but could also be more sceptical towards evidence 
and responses to climate change. This first result falls in line with the party’s discourse on 
climate change. It is compelling to note that the data from this research predates the recent shift 
in the party’s stance on climate change which could indicate that the SVP took a space its voters 
were leaning towards. 
4.1. Response Scepticism 
 The first model of this study yielded statistically significant results. Each step of the 
model accounted for more variance and showed that gender, education, institutional distrust 
and SVP identification correlated with CCRS. More precisely, male respondents tended to hold 
sceptic views, as well as lower-educated individuals, but age or the level of income had no 
effect. This finding falls in line with other research that pointed out that indicators of social 
status could yield various results (McCright & Dunlap, 2011; Poortinga et al., 2011). In 
accordance with the non-significance of income level, material risk did not appear to have any 
effect on response scepticism levels. Hence, material predictors (subjective and objective) did 
not structure the climate change responses. This result could be partly explained by 
Switzerland’s prosperous economic situation. Indeed, response scepticism being mostly based 
on opinions on policies such as taxes on fossil fuels or subsidies for renewable energy sources, 
citizens of ‘rich’ countries could be more inclined to absorb such changes given their general 
wealth. Indeed, it may also be that other determinants (relational and institutional) are more 
structuring not only in Switzerland but anywhere across the world.  
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 Institutional distrust was significantly associated with response scepticism while 
controlling for social status and self-appraisals. These findings are in accordance with 
McCright et al., (2016), who argued that adhesion to policies directed towards slowing climate 
change may clash with more conservative values, but do not fall in line with Jylhä & Hellmer's 
(2020) who found that anti-elitism feelings were not connected to CCS. The diverging results 
may be explained by the conceptualisation of scepticism in the present study. In other words, 
differentiating between different forms of scepticism may produce contrasting results. Bearing 
in mind that statistically small effects were found in this model, these results nevertheless 
indicate that at least one form of CCS may be connected to some common predictors of RWP, 
namely social status indicators and institutional distrust, a proxy for anti-elitism.  
 In sum, response scepticism appears to be linked with at least some indicators of RWP 
which partially confirms the hypothesis that common predictors of RWP also relate to CCRS. 
Perhaps most importantly, the mediation analysis further indicated that SVP identification was 
linked with response scepticism and that this relationship was at least partly explained by 
institutional distrust.  
4.2. Evidence Scepticism 
 As mentioned above, studies on climate change scepticism may be at least in part, form 
dependent. In other words, CCS is a complex notion that entails multiple facets and underlying 
factors. Nonetheless, unexpected results emerged from this study’s second model. Most 
notably, institutional distrust, material risk and social distrust were not found to be significantly 
associated with evidence scepticism. I expected both common predictors of RWP and 
institutional distrust to be strong predictors of evidence scepticism as previous research pointed 
out that RWP voters were more likely to hold conspiracist views and have negative attitudes 
towards science (Silva et al., 2017). It must be noted for instance that most respondents 
(>94%), when asked whether they thought that climate change had natural or anthropogenic 
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causes responded closer to the latter. Thus, one could argue that evidence scepticism may have 
only been ‘niche’ in this study’s sample. Still, some social status predictors had a statistically 
significant impact on the outcome. Older individuals were associated with scepticism, as well 
as less educated ones. The effect of education could be due to a lack of information on the 
matter of climate change may lead to false beliefs. It could also be explained by group 
identification as members may not discuss the matter in their social circles and thus be more 
penetrable to conspiracy theories. Higher levels of political inefficacy significantly correlated 
with a tendency to doubt the anthropogenic causes of climate change, which relates to RWP. 
This is a somewhat surprising result as political inefficacy is the sole predictor to be impactful 
in this model and does not conceptually directly relate to CCS. This will be discussed later on. 
Finally, SVP identification positively related to CCES while controlling for other variables 
which may indicate a link between supporting the SVP and doubting climate change’s 
anthropogenic causes. 
 To sum it up, evidence scepticism does not seem to relate to RWP or institutional 
distrust as well as response scepticism as the mediation analysis shows as well. This points 
towards the fact that different forms of scepticism may be held by different persons and 
motivated by discrete factors. The following part will attempt to explain and understand these 
results.  
4.3. Implications  
 This exploratory research provided a few compelling results. It appears that climate 
change response criticism is linked with lower indicators of social status, institutional distrust 
and RWP identification in Switzerland. Indeed, policy attitudes are complex opinions, and 
public responses to climate change can be influenced for instance by both socio-cultural and 
psychological factors (Leiserowitz, 2006). It appears that social status indicators (e.g. education 
level) and attitudes (e.g. institutional distrust) shown to be linked to RWP correlate well with 
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negative responses to policies tailored to harness global warming. The additional mediation 
analysis confirmed the link between SVP party identification and response scepticism through 
institutional distrust.  
4.3.1. Response Scepticism’s Paradox 
 Other studies have hinted at the prevalence of sceptic discourse in populist parties 
(Forchtner, 2019a; Forchtner et al., 2018). Compellingly, other authors have argued that RWP 
may use climate change as a means to protect the ‘nation’ or ‘heartland’ (Forchtner & Kølvraa, 
2015). This could at least partly explain this research’s varying results as populist parties have 
to balance their discourse between anti-elitism - one of their core factors (Kriesi, 2014; 
Rooduijn, 2014) – and the link between climate change mitigation and protection of the 
‘heartland’ (Forchtner et al., 2018). Moreover, these results could be further complexified by 
the idea that people were found to be more likely to support policies having national (which 
falls in line with RWP’s suggested “national homogeneity”) consequences (e.g. energy 
production shift) than taxes on individuals’ usage of fossil fuels (Dietz et al., 2007). The 
relationship between institutional distrust and response scepticism can be understood further 
by considering the fact that response scepticism is conceptually linked with policy making. 
Thus, individuals which tend to doubt the government, politicians or institutions may 
consequently question any policy change, including policies directed towards climate change. 
Another interpretation relates to institutional distrust as a proxy for anti-elitism. One could 
argue that anti-elitism entails political elites, but also cultural and scientific ones. Hence, the 
opposition between the ‘people’ and the ‘elites’ that RWP invokes may concern any type of 
elite rather than just political ones as the mediation analysis for CCRS showed.  
4.3.2. Evidence Scepticism, an Educational rather than Political Issue? 
 The results from the second hierarchical model first and foremost suggest, as other 
authors stated (Capstick & Pidgeon, 2014; Gemenis et al., 2012; Lockwood, 2018; Poortinga 
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et al., 2011; Van Rensburg, 2015), that climate change scepticism is indeed multidimensional. 
As written above, the relationship between CCS and RWP may be more complicated than it 
seems as climate change may be at a crossroads between rejection of the elites and protection 
of the ‘beauty of the heartland’. Still, the impact of the education level on the denial of global 
warming’s anthropogenic causes is a compelling result and emphasises the importance of 
information on climate change from a young age on for policy makers. This also indicates that 
further communication on the matter is needed in order to allow people to understand the 
phenomenon. On the other hand, the impact of political inefficacy and the lack of impact of 
institutional distrust are more complex to analyse. An eventual explanatory path could lead one 
to understand this result through the lens of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) for 
instance. Denying climate change could be a means of creating a group identity that would not 
be available through political efficacy, thus producing what some authors cunningly called 
‘cool dudes’ (Krange et al., 2019; McCright & Dunlap, 2011). Nevertheless, given the small 
number of respondents that declared themselves to be ‘evidence sceptics’, these results should 
be mitigated.  
 These results - which are to my knowledge and at time of writing only the second ones 
on the topic – have practical implications. First, policymakers should consider this link when 
designing global interventions to address climate change. The surge of right-wing populism in 
recent years took most politicians, pundits and scholars by surprise and its consequences, 
including on the global effort to harness global warming, should not be understated. More 
practically, these groups of voters should be included and kept in mind when designing new 
policies. Secondly, I argue that these results call for more research on the topic by populism 
scholars. I used a social representations approach to study the link between RWP and CCS to 
include as many variables as possible in an exploratory manner. As this does not allow for a 
precise analysis of the phenomenon, I added a mediation analysis based on the results of the 
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first two regressions which yielded significant results and emphasized that more targeted 
research is called for. Finally, this research underlines at least in part the growing divide 
between ‘doubters’ and ‘believers’ in climate change. The current state of affairs allows the 
use of such words on a topic on which the scientific community has reached an overwhelming 
consensus. This is an urgent matter and understanding more widely the reasons why individuals 
still do not adhere to its existence is just as urgent if global change is to happen.  
4.4. Limits and Ideas for Future Research  
 First, this research used secondary data and was cross-sectional. If secondary data 
permitted the use of bigger samples, items were not tailored to suit the conceptual framework 
used in this study. Principal component and reliability analyses addressed this flaw and this 
design was satisfactory given the explorative nature of the models, but future research should 
use experimental designs which allow for a more precise operationalisation. Moreover, the 
cross-sectional nature of this study does not allow to infer any causality between the variables. 
This was mitigated by using hierarchical regression models which focus on the explanatory 
power of each variable, but longitudinal analyses are undoubtedly called for. It would be 
particularly compelling to use data with a first wave predating the recent global movements of 
the ‘school strikes for climate’ and other demonstrations in other to study their effects. I would 
argue that these movements may have cemented some more radical views but also shifted 
individuals that were more ‘on the fence’.  
 Second, this research did not account for the other core factor of RWP, anti-
immigration. This was purely due to a decision to focus on two different forms of CCS rather 
than two different core factors of populism. Nonetheless, the Édition Spéciale of the SVP 
mentioned at the beginning of this paper presents climate change as an opportunity to reduce 
immigration in its discourse and furthermore states that immigration itself is responsible for 
climate change. This calls for research on the relationship between immigration and global 
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warming in populist discourse. Such studies could use discourse analyses and qualitative 
methods in order to unveil more underlying factors. Third, the present research solely focused 
on a Swiss sample, which may not be representative of other European or World countries 
given both its economic and political situation. Fourth, the relatively small amount of variance 
explained by independent variables in each model should be kept in mind when reading this 
research’s results. This indicates that future research should consider more dimensions of both 
RWP and CCS in order to produce more comprehensive explanations of their relationship.  
 Finally, the data used in this study is from the 8th wave of the ESS which was published 
in 2016. This predates recent social movements for climate justice as well as the discourse shift 
from certain populist parties or leaders. It thus would be compelling to replicate these models 
on more recent samples in order to paint a clearer picture of an ever-evolving and fast-changing 
climate situation. 
5. Conclusion  
 These findings suggest that RWP attitudes are linked at least partly with climate change 
response scepticism in Switzerland and that SVP supporters may hold sceptic views. Moreover, 
it appears that institutional distrust, one of populism’s core factors, holds a role in this 
relationship as a mediator between SVP identification and response scepticism. Evidence 
scepticism was found to have a link with political inefficacy and SVP identification but did not 
relate to RWP predictors. Thus, the results indicate that if rejecting policies directed towards 
harnessing climate change may be part of populist representations, doubting its anthropogenic 
causes may not use the same pathways and could relate more to education and information than 
anything else. This further shows that populism and climate change are multidimensional and 
should be studied as such.  
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 As other research showed, RWP holds a complicated relationship with climate change, 
sometimes using it as a means of calling for more protection of the ‘heartland’ natural beauty 
for the ‘people’ (Forchtner & Kølvraa, 2015) and other times as a rejection of the ‘elites’ by 
negating it (Forchtner et al., 2018). In brief, right-wing populism may be sceptical about 
climate change, but strategically rather than by denying it outright. 
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